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Comments and Casenotes
INTERGOVERNMENTAL TAX IMMUNITY-LIABIL-
ITY OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYEES
TO STATE INCOME TAX
Graves v. People of State of New York, ex rel O'Keefe'
The State of New York imposed an income tax on the
salary of the respondent, a resident of the State employed
as an examining attorney by the Home Owners' Loan Cor-
proation, an agency of the United States government. The
State Tax Commissioners rejected the respondent's claim
for a refund, based on the contention that his salary was
constitutionally exempt from State taxation, in that the
Home Owners' Loan Corporation was an instrumentality
of the United States and that he was necessarily perform-
ing an essential governmental function. On the authority
of New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves,2 this action of the
State Tax Commissioners was set aside by the Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court,' which was later
affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals.4  On certio-
rari, held (two justices dissenting): Reversed. A non-
discriminatory State income tax on salaries of Federal
governmental employees imposes no unconstitutional bur-
den on the performance of governmental functions by the
Federal government, in the absence of any contrary intima-
tion by Congress; any effect is the normal incident of our
dual system of government and one which the Constitution
presupposes.
The decision overrules almost a century of precedent,
the tax immunity of governmental employees having been
first laid down in 1842 in Dobbins v. Erie County5 and ap-
plied as late as 1937 in New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves6
and Brush v. Commissioner.7  It was rather clearly indi-
159 S. Ct. 595 (U. S. 1939).
299 U. S. 401, 57 S. Ct. 209, 81 L. Ed. 306 (1937). It was held that,
where the United States is the sole owner of a railroad carrying private
freight and passengers only as an Incident to governmental operations, the
officers and employees of such railroad were not subject to a State income
tax on their salaries.
253 App. Div. 91, 1 N. Y. Supp. (2nd) 196 (1937).
'278 N. Y. 691, 16 N. E. (2nd) 404 (1938).
6 16 Pet. 435, 10 L. Ed. 1022 (1842).
6 Supra n. 2.
300 U. S. 352, 57 S. Ct. 495, 81 L. Ed. 691 (1937).
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cated last year, however, by the decision in Helvering v.
Gerhardt,8 as well as by a line of cases narrowing the field
of intergovernmental tax immunity,9 that a change in ex-
isting doctrine was imminent, although it was possible to
speculate as to the nature of such change, in view of the
refusal of the Court at that time to over-rule specifically
Collector v. Day,10 in which the doctrine of reciprocal tax
immunity was first specifically declared. A similar de-
velopment has occurred in both Canada and Australia,
where there existed a constitutional basis for intergovern-
mental tax immunity similar in broad outline to that under
the United States Constitution,1' and this apparently was
not without its persuasive effect upon the Court in the
instant case. 2
While the case was immediately concerned only with
the question of State taxation of salaries of Federal em-
ployees, the decision goes further than this and the oppor-
tunity was seized to restate the entire doctrine of intergov-
ernmental tax immunity in an attempt to bring order into
the chaos and confusion presented by prior decisions. There
can be no doubt that Collector v. Day and other cases giv-
ing immunity to State employees against Federal taxation
have been overruled. No longer will it be necessary to
ponder nice questions as to whether a particular individual
is a governmental employee or merely an independent con-
tractor. There would seem to be little doubt that a similar
fate impends for the line of cases giving tax exemption in
sales to both State and Federal governments. 3
8 304 U. S. 405, 58 S. Ct. 969, 82 L. Ed. 1427 (1938).
9 See James v. Dravo Contracting Company, 302 U. S. 134, 58 S. Ct. 208,
82 L. Ed. 155 (1937); Helvering v. Therrell, 303 U. S. 218, 58 S. Ct. 539,
82 L. Ed. 758 (1938); Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corporation, 303
U. S. 376, 58 S. Ct. 623, 82 L. Ed. 907 (1938).
10 11 Wall. 113, 20 L. Ed. 122 (U. S. 1870).
"I See, as to Canada, Leprohon v. City of Ottawa, 2 Ont. App. 522 (1878);
Abbott v. City of St. John, 40 Can. Sup. Ct. 597 (1908) ; Caron v. The King,
(1924) A. C. 999. As to Australia, see D'Emden v. Pedder, 1 C. L. R. 91
(1904) ; Deakin v. Webb, 1 C. L. R. 585 (1905) ; Webb v. Outrim, (1907)
A. C. 81; Amalgamated Society of Engineers v. Adelaide S.S. Co., 28 C. L.
R. 129 (1920) ; West v. Commissioner of Taxation, 56 C. L. R. 657 (1937).
12 See the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 59 S. Ct. 602,
603.
18 As, e. g., Panhandle Oil Co. v. State of Mississippi, ex rel. Knox, 277
U. S. 218, 48 S. Ct. 451, 72 L. Ed. 857 (1928) ; Indian Motorcycle Co. v.
United States, 283 U. S. 570, 51 S. Ct. 601, 75 L. Ed. 1277 (1931) ; Graves v.
Texas Company, 298 U. S. 393, 56 S. Ct. 818, 80 L. Ed. 1236 (1936). In
Helvering v. Gerhardt, 8upra n. 8, it was intimated strongly that the effect
of such taxes on the performance of a governmental function did not differ
from the effect of a tax on salaries of government employees.
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As restated, the doctrine becomes in all cases a question
of economic incidence; with reference to both State and
Federal governments, it is made to rest entirely upon
whether, in a given case, a substantial burden is imposed
upon the ability of either government to perform any func-
tion which it has the power to undertake. And, whereas
heretofore in certain cases the existence of such a burden
has been presupposed,14 one attacking the applicability of
a tax on such grounds must now show affirmatively an
actual and substantial burdensome effect upon the perform-
ance of governmental functions. For the famous dictum
of Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland15 that
"the power to tax involves the power to destroy", there is
substituted that of Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissent in the
Panhandle Oil Company case 6 that "the power to tax is not
the power to destroy while this Court sits". 17 Intergovern-
mental immunity has now become a question of degree in
all cases.
Viewed simply from the standpoint of doctrinaire the-
ory, the restatement of the doctrine has followed logical
lines. Intergovernmental immunity from taxation neces-
sarily interferes with the ability of both Federal and State
governments to exercise-the one a granted, the other a
reserved power-necessary to the existence of each. If
there is to be implied such a constitutional limitation upon
the exercise of the power by either, it can properly be so
only because the restriction is also necessary to the exist-
ence of each and to the protection of each in its ability to
perform the governmental functions allocated to it. It
follows that such a limitation should only obtain in cases
where the exercise of the taxing power by one government
would appreciably and demonstrably interfere with the
other's performance of duties imposed upon the latter by
our system of government. Little quarrel can be found
with the Court's conclusion in the instant case that a non-
discriminatory tax on salaries of governmental employees
2' Cf. Metcalf and Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514, 46 S. Ct. 172, 70 L. ]Ed.
384 (1926). Here Mr. Justice Stone, who also wrote the opinion in the
instant case, said: "This court has repeatedly held that those agencies
through which either government immediately and directly exercises its
sovereign powers, are immune from the taxing power of the other."
154 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (U. S. 1819).
1 Supra n. 13.
17 Quoted with approval by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his concurring
opinion in the instant case, as having "brushed away" the "web of unreality
spun from Marshall's famous dictum".
1939]
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would not appreciably interfere with the activities of the
employing government.
From the standpoint of practical administration of gov-
ernment, however, the substitution of such an elastic stan-
dard seems likely to present serious difficulties of applica-
tion, with which it may be doubted whether the Courts are
equipped to deal satisfactorily. It seems to be implicit in
the opinion that a discriminatory tax would be unconstitu-
tional; but whether a non-discriminatory tax could yet be
so burdensome as to make it inapplicable to governmental
agencies, and if so, how to test the degree of burden, are
questions which remain unanswered. It by no means fol-
lows necessarily from the present decision, for example,
that governmental securities and interest received there-
from are no longer entitled to the immunity to which they
have been heretofore held entitled.'8  This and other such
questions will depend for their answer upon the extent to
which in any given case the Supreme Court will regard a
tax as impeding unduly the exercise of governmental
powers. As to this, there may well be present validity in
Marshall's words in McCulloch v. Maryland,"0 where he
speaks of the "perplexing inquiry, so unfit for the judicial
department, what degree of taxation is the legitimate use
and what degree may amount to the abuse of the power".
The decision recognizes that Congress, at least, may, as
incidental to the power to create Federal governmental
agencies, by express language grant them immunity from
State taxation, to an extent which the Court declares it
unnecessary at present to state. This was also suggested
in James v. Dravo Contracting Company.20 The question
at once arises as to whether any limitations exist on this
power, or whether the determination of Congress, that such
immunity is necessary to the proper functioning of the
agency, would bind the Courts, as presenting a political
rather than a judicial question.2' Only recently, a grant
of such immunity by Congress has been held effectual
to prevent subjection of a Federal agency to the Maryland
recording tax.'- Though it was not specifically stated
"I Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, 7 L. Ed. 481 (1829) ;
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company, 158 U. S. 601, 15 S. Ct. 912, 39
L. Ed. 1108 (1895).
19 Supra n. 15.201302 U. S. 134, 58 S. Ct. 208, 82 L. Ed. 155 (1937).
21 Cf. the reasoning in Coleman v. Miller, 59 S. Ct. 972 (U. S. 1939),
which would seem quite applicable.
21a Pittman v. Home Owners' Loan Corporation (decided Nov. 6, 1939)
7 U. S. Law Wk. 503.
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that Congress could grant an immunity greater in extent
than the Constitutional immunity, this nevertheless seems
the result of the decision; the tax involved was non-dis-
criminatory, and in itself, apart from the Congressional
declaration, would not have seemed unduly or even ap-
preciably burdensome with respect to the functioning of
the Federal governmental agent.
Of possibly equal significance with the actual result in
the instant case, is the refusal of the Court to reach it
through the reasoning urged by the New York Tax Com-
missioners. The latter had argued that the rule refusing
immunity to State agencies performing non-governmental
functions22 should be extended to the Federal government
and that such agencies as the HOLC should be regarded as
non-governmental in character. While it has been urged
by a few authorities, including the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals,23 that the rule was applicable to both State and Fed-
eral governments, the question has never before been di-
rectly discussed by the Supreme Court. In the present
case, it is stated flatly that, since the Federal government
is one of delegated powers, "its every action within its con-
stitutional power is governmental action" and that all
activities constitutionally authorized by Congress must
stand on a parity with respect to their constitutional im-
munity from taxation..
It is at least possible that this may presage eventual
abandonment of the "governmental function" test as ap-
plied to the State governments also, and that the entire
question may become one of the degree of interference
with governmental performance of any activity. Cases re-
fusing immunity to State agencies on the ground of non-
governmental functioning, can readily be fitted into the
broader rule; and in fact the most recent of these seems to
be in part so reasoned. 4 The confusion and illogicality
resulting from the attempt to distinguish between govern-
mental and proprietary activities would be thus avoided.
22 See South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437, 26 S. Ct. 110, 50 L.
Ed. 261 (1905) ; Helvering v. Powers, 293 U. S. 214, 55 S. Ct. 171, 79 L. Ed.
291 (1934).
23 State Tax Commission v. Baltimore National Bank, 169 Md. 65, 180 A.
260 (1935), affirmed on other grounds, 297 U. S. 209, 56 S. Ct. 417, 80 L. Ed.
586 (1936).
24 Allen v. Regents of University System of Georgia, 304 U. S. 439, 58
S. Ct. 980, 82 L. Ed. 1448 (1938).
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